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ON MAXIMIZING DETERRENCE PER DOLLAR 
Andy Spalding* 
INTRODUCTION 
Professor Peter Reilly addresses concerns1 that practitioners in this 
space have privately and publicly debated for years. What exactly is 
cooperation credit? Can we quantify it? The government promises that 
self-reporting is in our self-interest, but the government’s interest in 
saying so is obvious enough. What evidence can the government 
provide? Having participated in these conversations myself, I can attest 
to the prevalence of outside counsel advising companies to self-report, 
all the while aware of their recommendation’s uncertain basis. 
Companies often accept the advice begrudgingly, and understandably 
so. 
The difficulty of measuring this credit is somewhat ironic, given the 
government’s dependence on cooperation. As this essay will show, our 
modern enforcement regime, which has four components—the internal 
or independent investigation, voluntary disclosure, cooperation credit, 
and a negotiated settlement2—is the government’s method of 
maximizing general deterrence with finite resources. Ensuring that 
defendant companies see sufficient incentive to self-report is therefore 
critical to advancing the policy goals that inhere in anti-bribery 
enforcement. 
Hence the value of Professor Reilly’s critique. He argues that the 
government “must provide greater transparency regarding specific and 
calculable benefits that can be achieved through self-reporting and 
cooperation”3 in FCPA settlements. And indeed, it may be powerful 
evidence of his argument’s force that very recently, the government has 
taken measures to do that very thing. Put another way, Professor 
Reilly’s is an idea whose time has come. 
This Essay provides both background and foreground to Professor 
Reilly’s article. It first explains the role of self-reporting and 
cooperation in anti-bribery enforcement, suggesting that the government 
is essentially seeking to adjust both the numerator and denominator of a 
ratio that might be called Deterrence Per Dollar. This Essay will then 
describe and endorse Professor Reilly’s critique of FCPA enforcement, 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Professor of Law, the University of Richmond School of Law. 
 1. Peter R. Reilly, Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Bribery 
Worldwide: Federal Transparency and Voluntary Disclosure Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1683, 1683 (2015).  
 2. Andy Spalding, Andy Spalding on Brazil’s Third Pillar: The Clean Companies Act, 
THE FCPA BLOG (July 25, 2016), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/7/25/andy-spalding-on-
brazils-third-pillar-the-clean-companies-ac.html.  
 3. Reilly, supra note 1, at 1683. 
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and show how the government seems to have recently responded to that 
critique with a flurry of important reforms. Finally, I briefly discuss the 
prospects of adopting additional reforms, and conclude by sounding a 
hopeful note that these would likewise command Professor Reilly’s 
support.  
I. WHY SELF-REPORTING? 
The government’s incentive for recommending self-reporting may 
be underappreciated. The more superficial explanation holds that the 
government is trying to get someone else to do its work: Rather than 
conducting its own investigation, it can just pressure the defendant to do 
so. This way of thinking is true as far as it goes, but the real reason runs 
deeper.  
An enforcement agency of course begins with a limited budget. The 
agency’s ultimate aim is general deterrence—preventing would-be 
offenders from committing a similar crime. Accordingly, the 
government is trying to get maximal deterrence on a constrained budget. 
It seeks the greatest deterrence “bang for the buck.” This figure might 
be best expressed as a ratio: deterrence per dollar (DPD). An 
enforcement agency seeks to maximize this ratio, getting as much 
deterrence as possible for the dollars it has available. 
Efforts to increase deterrence can then be understood as tinkering 
with either half of this ratio. The government may seek to increase the 
numerator, while keeping the denominator constant. That is, it might 
find ways to improve general deterrence without increasing its budget, 
rendering enforcement more efficient. Or, it may on occasion find its 
denominator increased, in which case it has an increased budget. With 
an increased denominator comes an expectation that the additional 
enforcement efforts this money will buy will at least keep the ratio 
constant. Each of these—increasing deterrence either with or without 
increasing the budget—will happen from time to time in an enforcement 
agency’s history. But irrespective of the denominator (the budget’s 
size), the government seeks to maximize DPD.  
In the FCPA space, if not in white-collar enforcement generally, the 
government has relied on two principal methods to maximize DPD. The 
first is the four-part enforcement regime referenced above.4 The 
government expects a corporate defendant to pay for its own 
investigation, voluntarily disclose the findings, and cooperate with any 
further investigation. To incentivize this behavior, the government 
offers a reduced sentence (the cooperation credit) which it can guarantee 
by promising a negotiated settlement in the form of a deferred or non-
prosecution agreement (hence avoiding the costs and unpredictability of 
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trial). The defendant company will have financed an investigation—
either internal or independent—and turn over its findings to the 
enforcement agency. The government will typically investigate 
further—and expect the defendant to cooperate with that 
investigation—but the government will rely heavily on the company’s 
report.5 This procedure was formalized in the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s adoption of the Organizational Guidelines in 1991, and, 
as Professor Reilly chronicles, through a subsequent series of memos 
and policy statements by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).6 
If cooperation credit means anything at all, it means that the 
government has reduced the penalty and, so the critique goes, reduced 
the penalty’s deterrent value. But the government has to believe that the 
increased deterrence gained from the defendant’s investigation and self-
reporting is greater than the lost deterrence of the cooperation credit. 
That is, self-disclosure is, or is assumed to be, a deterrence net gain.  
Because the government is spared the resource-intensive investigation 
and prosecution, self-reporting spreads the government’s limited 
resources among many more defendants than would conventional 
prosecution. 
But there is a second, and perhaps less appreciated, instrument in the 
government’s arsenal for increasing deterrence: incentivizing the 
adoption of compliance programs. Compliance is variously defined as 
an “alignment between the[] organization’s behavior and professed 
values”7 or “the processes by which an organization seeks to ensure that 
employees and other constituents conform to applicable norms—which 
can include either the requirements of laws or regulations or the internal 
rules of the organization.”8 Compliance as a matter of practice has 
erupted in the last two decades or so, leading Sean Griffith to announce 
that “American corporations have witnessed the dawn of a new era of 
compliance.”9 
Compliance might be understood as a kind of preemptive 
deterrence.10 Unlike the above-described four-part enforcement regime, 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1723.  
 6. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1692–1700.  
 7. Matt Kelly, Nicole Sandford, & Thomas Rollauer, 2014 Compliance Trends Survey, 
IN FOCUS, 1, 7 (2014), deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/files/2014/06/Compliance 
_Week_Compliance_Survey_20141.pdf.  
 8. GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF GOVERNANCE, RISK MANAGEMENT, AND 
COMPLIANCE 3 (2014). 
 9. Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 2075, 2077 (2016). 
 10. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen, Removing Prosecutors from the Boardroom: Limiting 
Prosecutorial Discretion to Impose Structural Reforms, in PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: 
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which is of course inherently punitive, compliance is preventative. The 
government has devised multiple ways for incentivizing companies to 
adopt these preventative programs. The first, in 1991, was the adoption 
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines for 
Organizations.11 The Organizational Guidelines included both a penalty 
mitigation for the implementation of an effective compliance program 
and an increase in criminal penalties generally (thus augmenting the 
value of the penalty mitigation).12 Then in 1999 came the DOJ’s famous 
Holder Memorandum, which committed prosecutors to considering the 
“existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program”13 in 
deciding whether to indict corporations. Shortly thereafter, and in the 
wake of the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, the DOJ began 
relying heavily on deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements, which often require new compliance procedures of the 
defendant corporation.14 Details of these programs, when provided in 
the settlement documents, become an additional medium for articulating 
the government’s views on effective compliance. Finally, the 
government will occasionally publish guidance documents such as the 
DOJ’s and SEC’s Resource Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act.15  
We have learned in recent years, however, that the U.S. commitment 
to promoting compliance has its limits. Just as Professor Reilly notes, a 
groundswell of commentary began to emerge around 2005 that 
advocated for the formal statutory adoption of a compliance defense: 
Where the defendant can demonstrate that it had in place, at the time of 
the violation, an up-to-standard compliance program, and that the 
defendant followed that program in good faith, the defendant would not 
be liable for the misconduct of employees acting in contravention of 
that compliance program.16 This movement was buttressed by the 
United Kingdom’s adoption of a limited compliance defense as part of 
its Bribery Act of 2010.17 This movement’s principal lobby group 
                                                                                                                 
USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 62, 71 (Anthony S. Barkow & 
Rachel E. Barkow eds., N.Y.U. Press 2011).  
 11. Griffith, supra note 9, at 2084 (citing Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects 
of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 839 (1994)).  
 12. See id. at 2084–85.  
 13. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. to All Component Heads & U.S. Attorneys 
(June 16, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-
fraud/legacy/2010/04/11/charging-corps.PDF. 
 14. See Griffith, supra note 9, at 2088. 
 15. SEC & DOJ, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (Nov. 
12, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.  
 16. See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1728 n.244. 
 17. Bribery Act 2010, c. 7, § 2 (UK), 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/pdfs/ukpga_20100023_en.pdf.  
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would become the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which authored a white 
paper and began an aggressive lobbying and PR campaign.18 Though 
the DOJ resisted the proposal,19 current events of the time would 
ultimately wield the sword that felled the Chamber’s movement. In 
2012, the New York Times ran an expose that detailed an alleged wide-
spread bribery scheme at Wal-Mart in Mexico.20 The story became a 
media feeding frenzy, effectively ending (or at least stalling 
indefinitely) any effort to enact a law that could be construed as 
weakening the FCPA.  
There will be no statutory compliance defense to the FCPA in the 
foreseeable future. But the effort to increase incentives to self-report is 
alive and well, both among commentators pleading for reforms—not 
least of which is Professor Reilly himself—and the government, which 
recently demonstrated that it has been paying attention.  
II. PROFESSOR REILLY SPEAKS; THE DOJ LISTENS 
Professor Reilly asks two questions. First, what is a company’s 
present incentive to self-report? And if that incentive is weak—which 
he most assuredly believes—what can the government do to strengthen 
it? He concludes what many companies have believed for years, 
whether their outside counsel concurred or not: that in many 
circumstances it may be in a company’s self-interest to not self-report; 
let the government detect a crime the good old-fashioned way. But as a 
matter of policy, Professor Reilly finds this state of affairs 
unsatisfactory. Accordingly, he urges the government to make the 
incentives to self-report stronger, more specific, and more reliable. He, 
too, wants the government to maximize its DPD.  
Professor Reilly makes the case anew by comparing a number of 
big-ticket FCPA settlements, some of which involved self-reporting 
while others did not.21 His review of these cases again confirms what 
Stephen Choi and Kevin Davis found in one 2011 study,22 and Bruce 
                                                                                                                 
 18. Andrew Weissmann & Alixandra Smith, Restoring Balance: Proposed Amendments 
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act , U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 1, 7, 11–
14 (2011),,  www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/restoringbalance_fcpa.pdf.  
 19. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Panel at the 2012 National Lawyers Convention, 51 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 433, 447–48 (2014).  
 20. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level 
Struggle, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-
mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 21.  See Reilly, supra note 1, at 1700-1710. 
 22. Reilly, supra note 1, at 1709–10 (citing Stephen J. Choi & Kevin Davis, Foreign 
Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 20 (Public Law and Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 12-35, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487). 
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Hinchey found in another:23 the absence of any basis in the published 
FCPA settlements for the claim that penalties are in fact reduced when 
defendants voluntarily disclose.24 Professor Reilly therefore makes a 
plea for additional and more specific incentives to self-disclose. As it 
turns out, the DOJ seems to have heard him. 
In the last year, the DOJ has taken a series of dramatic steps to 
increase deterrence. In some cases, it has adopted new methods, seeking 
to increase the DPD’s numerator. In others it has seen its budget grow 
considerably, thus increasing the denominator (with an expectation that 
the numerator will likewise increase proportionally).25 But will these 
measures address Professor Reilly’s concern, and significantly increase 
self-reporting? 
The first occurred in September 2015 when the Deputy Attorney 
General released a memo, now known as the “Yates Memo,” that 
announced a dramatic new focus on individual liability for corporate 
wrongdoing.26 With a declared intention to “fully leverage its 
resources,”27 or in other words, maximize DPD, the DOJ announced six 
changes to policy,28 each of which was incorporated into the U.S. 
Attorneys Manual.29 First, a company will not receive cooperation 
credit unless it provides to the DOJ “all relevant facts relating to the 
individuals responsible for the misconduct.”30 The company must 
identify all individuals regardless of their position in the company and 
provide all relevant information.31 Second, both criminal and civil 
corporate investigations should focus on individuals from the start of 
the investigation.32 Third, the attorneys handling the civil and criminal 
investigations should communicate with each other regularly.33 In the 
FCPA context, this would typically mean the DOJ and SEC attorneys. 
Fourth, corporate resolutions—meaning deferred prosecution and non-
prosecution agreements—will not provide protection from liability for 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Id. (citing Bruce Hinchey, Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent 
FCPA Enforcements and Suggested Improvements, 40 PUB. CONT. L.J. 393, 399, 415 (2011)).  
 24. Id. at 1703, 1709.  
 25. DOJ Asks for $1.1 Billion Increase for Enforcement Components in FY 2017 Budget,  
FISHER BROYLES, https://www.fisherbroyles.com/doj-asks-for-1-1-billion-increase-for-
enforcement-components-in-fy-2017-budget/ (last visited July 31, 2016). 
 26. Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Attorney Gen. to the Assistant 
Attorney General, Antitrust Div., et al., (Sept. 9, 2015), 
www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download.  
 27. Id. at 2.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 3.  
 30. Id. at 2.  
 31. Id. at 3.  
 32. Id. at 4.  
 33. Id.  
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individuals within the company.34 Fifth, the corporate resolutions 
should not occur without a “clear plan” to resolve individual cases 
before the statute of limitations expires.35 Finally, civil lawyers should 
decide whether to prosecute individuals based on factors other than an 
ability to pay a penalty.36 
The Yates Memo attempts to increase DPD’s numerator. That is, the 
government apparently believes that these individual prosecutions will 
improve deterrence. But scholars are not in agreement on this point. The 
movement to hold individuals accountable finds its original scholarly 
support in the work of Jennifer Arlen. Her seminal 1994 article, The 
Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,37 criticized 
the view—widely accepted at the time—that imposing strict vicarious 
liability on corporations for employee misconduct will invariably 
reduce corporate crime.38 She starts from the premise that many forms 
of corporate crime—such as securities fraud, government procurement 
fraud, or some environmental crimes—are difficult for the government 
to detect,39 and that the government therefore needs the corporation to 
investigate and sanction internal misconduct.40 However, Arlen shows 
that strict vicarious liability will sometimes incentivize corporations to 
spend less on internal policing.41 She therefore has advocated 
adjustments to corporate criminal liability that will better incentivize the 
corporate defendant to investigate and self-report, thus providing to the 
government the evidence it needs to prosecute individuals.42 However, 
in response to the recent chorus of pleadings for further individual 
liability, Sam Buell will argue in a forthcoming book that corporate 
liability, while imperfect, may be the best of all available regimes and 
the proper focus of enforcement resources.43 
But focusing on individual prosecutions has an obvious downside, 
which the government recognizes: They are more resource-intensive 
than settling with corporations, and by a factor of several. The Yates 
Memo thus likely could not have issued without a second important 
change. In April of 2016 the DOJ announced an increase in enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Id. at 5. 
 35. Id. at 6. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 833, 834 (1994).  
 38. Id. at 833–34.  
 39. Id. at 835.  
 40. See id.  
 41. See id. at 836.  
 42. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An 
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997). 
 43. SAM BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S 
CORPORATE AGE (W.W. Norton & Co. forthcoming Aug. 2016).  
240 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 67 
 
resources. Ten prosecutors were added to the Fraud Section’s FCPA 
Unit, an increase of “more than 50%. . . .”44 So too did the FBI create 
three “new squads of special agents devoted to FCPA investigations and 
prosecutions.”45 This increase in resources allows the government to 
implement the Yates Memo without diverting resources away from the 
self-disclosure regime and thus keep that high-deterrence practice in 
tact. 
The DOJ has increased its resources in an additional way. In 
November 2015, the DOJ Fraud Section hired a full-time compliance 
expert, Hui Chen. The DOJ’s expressed purpose in retaining Chen is to 
provide “expert guidance” to prosecutors as they evaluate the 
compliance programs that were in place at the time the misconduct 
occurred.46 She will help the DOJ develop benchmarks for compliance 
programs and, to this end, communicate with stakeholders.47 Similarly, 
when the resolution of a case includes requiring enhanced compliance 
measures, Chen will be involved in evaluating those measures.48 
The third recent policy shift was likewise announced in April 2016, 
when the DOJ Fraud Section released a memo, styled the Enforcement 
Plan and Guidance.49 In addition to the increase in resources described 
above, the memo announced the DOJ’s unique Pilot Program. The pilot 
program provides specific, quantified penalty reductions in exchange 
for various degrees of disclosure, cooperation, and remediation.50 
Where the company cooperates and remediates to the DOJ’s 
satisfaction, but did not voluntarily disclose, it will receive “at most” a 
25% reduction of the Sentencing Guidelines fine range.51 However, 
where the company has met all three requirements—voluntary 
disclosure, cooperation, and remediation—the DOJ “may provide up to 
a 50% reduction” off the bottom end of the Sentencing Guidelines fine 
range and generally will not require the appointment of a monitor.52  
Here, finally, the DOJ tacitly responds to Professor Reilly’s critique 
head-on. The Pilot Program is plainly an attempt to make the benefits of 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Memorandum from Andrew Weissmann, Chief, Fraud Section, The Fraud Section’s 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance 1 (Apr. 5, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/838386/download [hereinafter Weissmann Memo]. 
 45. Id.  
 46. See Press Release, DOJ, New Compliance Expert Retained by the DOJ Fraud Section 
(Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/file/790236/download.  
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Weissmann Memo, supra note 44.  
 50. Remediation generally means adopting a compliance program, disciplining 
employees, and related compliance measures. See id. at 8. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
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self-disclosure more “specific and calculable.”53 But it was not, and is 
not, the most visionary of proposals for increasing deterrence.  
III. THE JACOBSON DECLINATION PROPOSAL 
Since as far back as April of 2012, an attractive alternative has been 
on the table which constitutes a kind of compromise between a statutory 
defense and the current Pilot Program. Billy Jacobson, former second-
in-command prosecutor at the DOJ’s Fraud Unit and now a partner at 
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, first floated his proposal in an April 
2012 issue of Bloomberg’s Criminal Law Reporter.54 Jacobson proposes 
that rather than a formal statutory amendment, the Fraud Unit exercise 
its prosecutorial prosecution and adopt a policy of not bringing FCPA-
related criminal charges if the company can demonstrate that it satisfied 
five criteria. Those criteria are: 1) voluntary disclosure of the violation, 
2) no participation in the illegal conduct by senior management, 3) full 
cooperation with the government, including providing evidence and 
other information against employees, directors, and agents of the 
company, 4) remedial measures to prevent future violations, including 
disciplining culpable employees and adopting improved internal 
controls and anti-corruption training, and 5) having adopted a strong 
compliance program before the illegal conduct occurred.55 
Shortly after Jacobson’s article was published, the New York Times 
ran its abovementioned expose on Wal-Mart’s alleged bribery in 
Mexico.56 Having sounded the death knell for any statutory amendment, 
Jacobson’s proposal of a more informal policy became all the more 
attractive. Three years later, in November of 2015, the Washington Post 
reported that the DOJ Fraud Section was considering a proposal that 
sounded quite similar to Jacobson’s.57 But alas, the DOJ elected instead 
to try its Pilot Program. Jacobson argued on The FCPA Blog that the 
program was a “step forward” but “falls short of accomplishing its 
intended goal and certainly is not the bold policy pronouncement for 
which many were hoping.”58 He explains that this is true in several 
ways. First, it only puts a number on a practice that was already well-
                                                                                                                 
 53. Riley, supra note 1.  
 54. Billy Jacobson, No Legislation Necessary: A Five-Part Test to Negate Corporate 
Criminal Liability in FCPA Cases, 91 BLOOMBERG CRIM. L. REV. 77 (2012).  
 55. Id.  
 56. Barstow, supra note 20.  
 57. Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department Could Give Firms a Pass on Foreign Bribery If 
They Confess, WASH. POST (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/justice-department-weighs-changes-in-how-it-pursues-foreign-bribery-
cases/2015/11/10/95ef0322-87be-11e5-9a07-453018f9a0ec_story.html.  
 58. Billy Jacobson, Billy Jacobson on the New FCPA Guidance: DOJ Swings and Misses, 
THE FCPA BLOG (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/4/7/billy-jacobson-on-the-
new-fcpa-guidance-doj-swings-and-misse.html.  
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established: providing reduced penalties in exchange for disclosure, 
cooperation, and remediation. Second, even this informal policy leaves 
the DOJ “ample room to avoid according the full benefit:”59 It provides 
that the agency “may” provide the reduction and will “consider” a 
declination. But ultimately, the fundamental problem with the Pilot 
Program is that it “does not go nearly as far as it could have in serving 
the goals of law enforcement, while also providing more certainty to 
companies.”60 Jacobson’s proposal, by contrast, would both better serve 
the interests both of law enforcement and of companies. His five-part 
test for granting a declination would “virtually guarantee[]” an increase 
in voluntary disclosures, thereby allowing companies to go after both 
companies and individuals (thus advancing the goals of the Yates 
Memo).61 So too would his proposal provide companies with added 
incentives to adopt rigorous compliance programs: It would provide 
companies the assurance that they would not be prosecuted if “they did 
everything the government wanted them to do” by adopting such 
programs.62 
Jacobson convincingly makes the case that his proposal would in no 
way weaken or dilute the FCPA, but instead advance its purposes by 
incentivizing compliance and increasing deterrence. It represents an 
alignment of interests between the government and the private sector. 
The critical question thus becomes: Is the DOJ still listening? 
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT WOULD REILLY DO? 
When the Pilot Program ends in April 2017, the DOJ will consider 
anew the available options for increasing what we are here calling 
Deterrence Per Dollar. The FCPA bar, and industry organizations, will 
organize to convince the DOJ that it can and should go further to 
enhance enforcement. Academics, including the author of this essay, 
will likely join the effort. Will Professor Reilly? Given his plea for more 
specific and calculable self-reporting incentives, one can only hope. 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id.  
